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Cohort studies of aetiology and prognosis:
they’re differentIntroduction
Cohort designs arewidely used in epidemiological research. The
key features of cohort studies are that: (a) a sample of participants
at risk of a particular outcome (the ‘cohort’) is identiﬁed; (b) data
on individual cohort members’ exposures to certain risk factors
and their subsequent outcomes are obtained; and (c) associations
between exposures and outcomes are quantiﬁed.
Here are two examples of cohort studies.
Paul and colleagues1 conducted a range of physical and
cognitive tests, including balance tests and the Mini-Mental State
Examination, on 205 community-dwelling people who had
Parkinson’s disease. Subsequently, the participants used falls
diaries to document any falls that occurred over the next 6 months.
The analysis examined associations between physical and cogni-
tive risk factors and the incidence rate of falls.
Moseley and colleagues2 studied 1549 patients presenting to
hospital with an acutewrist fracture. A number of clinical variables
such as pain and swelling were assessed in the ﬁrst week after
fracture. Four months later, each participant was contacted by
telephone and, where necessary, undertook a clinical examination
to determine whether he or she had developed complex regional
pain syndrome (CRPS). The analysis examined associations
between the clinical variables and the development of CRPS.
Both of these studies were cohort studies, but they had quite
different aims. The Paul study was designed to examine factors
that cause a health outcome (in this case, falls). That is, the aim of
the ﬁrst study was to understand the mechanisms or aetiology of
falls in people with Parkinson’s disease. In contrast, the Moseley
study was designed to identify factors that predict a health
outcome (the development of CRPS after wrist fracture). Its aim
was to generate prognoses for people who have had a wrist
fracture.
In general, two types of cohort studies can be distinguished:
aetiologic studies, which are concerned with understanding the
mechanisms that cause health outcomes, and prognostic studies,
which are concerned with prediction of health outcomes.
Even though the same research design—a cohort study—can be
used to answer questions about both aetiology and prognosis,
the way in which cohort studies of aetiology and prognosis are
designed and analysed should be very different. Surprisingly,
there have been few explicit discussions of this distinction in the
epidemiology literature. Perhaps that is because, historically,
epidemiology has overwhelmingly been concerned with questions
about aetiology. The purpose of this Research Note is, therefore, to
provide an introduction to differences in the design and analysis of
cohort studies of aetiology and prognosis.
For more extensive discussions of design and analysis of studies
of aetiology and prognosis, the interested reader is referred to the
excellent introductory textbook by Grobbee and Hoes.3 In addition,
Holland4 provides a rigorous grounding in the concept of causation,
and Jewell5 provides a clear, entry-level presentation of design of
epidemiological studies aimed at understanding causation. Hernanhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jphys.2014.07.005
1836-9553/ 2014 Australian Physiotherapy Association. Published by Elsevier B.V. Aland Robbins6,7 provide a lucid presentation of contemporary
statistical methods for studying causation, including the use of
causal modelling in longitudinal studies. A group of leading
methodologists recently published a series of articles that provide
an overview of the design and analysis of prognostic studies.8–11
Steyerberg11 has written a very accessible textbook on statistical
methods for prognostic research.
Differences between cohort studies of aetiology and prognosis
Objectives
A pre-requisite for investigating either causation or prediction
is to identify associations between exposures and outcomes.
However, the researcher who is concerned with aetiology is
ultimately interested in identifying associations that are causal,
whereas the researcher who is concerned with prediction does not
need to differentiate between causal and non-causal associations;
in the latter case, any association, causal or non-causal, can fulﬁll
the role of predicting outcomes.
The study by Paul and colleagues, described above, sought to
determine factors that caused people with Parkinson’s disease to
fall. The task for the investigators was to establish whether
putative aetiologic factors (impaired physical capacity or impaired
cognition) really did cause falls. The measure of the success of that
study is the extent to which it was able to distinguish between
putative aetiologic factors that truly do and do not cause falls. In
contrast, the study by Moseley and colleagues was explicitly not
concerned with determining causes of CRPS; it was designed,
instead, to identify prognosticmarkers.Whether thosemarkers are
causal or not was of no relevance, because the goal was to predict,
not to understand aetiology. The primary measure of the success
of theMoseley study is the extent towhich itwas able to accurately
predict who would go on to develop CRPS.
Some readers might think that the distinction between cohort
studies of aetiology and prognosis is simply that studies of
aetiology monitor healthy participants in order to determine who
develops the disease of interest, whereas studies of prognosis
monitor people who already have a health condition in order to
determine who develops particular disease-related outcomes.13
However, as these examples show, that way of distinguishing
studies of aetiology and prognosis is problematic: cohort studies of
initially healthy participants could either investigate factors that
cause disease to develop, or factors that predict who will develop
disease; and cohort studies of people who already have a disease
could either seek to identify exposures that cause sequelae of the
disease, or exposures that predict whowill develop sequelae of the
disease.
Many epidemiologists are reluctant to use the word ‘cause’
when theywrite reports of their cohort studies. Instead, they claim
that they are seeking to identify ‘associations’. The justiﬁcation for
this practice appears to be that epidemiological studies use
observational designs, which provide a less rigorous foundation forl rights reserved.
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studies, so observational studies should not be used to support
claims about causation. However, demonstration of the existence
of an association between an exposure and a health outcome is of
little or no intrinsic interest. Ultimately, demonstration of an
association is only useful if the association can be shown to be
either causal or predictive.14 It may be difﬁcult to establish
causation, but establishing causation is, nonetheless, often the
ultimate objective.
The reluctance of some epidemiologists to make claims about
causationmeans that it is often not clear whether particular cohort
studies are designed to investigate aetiology or prognosis. The lack
of clarity is not helped by the use of vague terminology: reports of
epidemiological studies refer to the exposures of interest as ‘risk
factors’ or ‘predictors’ without ever making it clear if the interest is
in causal factors (for the purposes of understanding disease
aetiology) or predictive factors (for the purposes of making
prognosis). Epidemiologists should not be shy about the objectives
of their cohort studies; they should be explicit about whether the
aim is to investigate aetiology or prognosis.
Choice of exposure variables
In a classic paper,4 Holland described howhe and Donald Rubin,
pioneers in the development of research methods for establishing
causation, proposed the slogan ‘No causation without manipula-
tion’. They meant that it is not possible to talk meaningfully about
the causal effects of a variable unless it is clear how that variable
could be manipulated. For example, Holland contends that it is
usually meaningless to talk about the causal effect of race because
it is not possible to conceive of how a person’s race could be
changed. The causal effect of an exposure variable must be
understood as the difference in an individual’s outcomes with and
without exposure to that variable,4 yet it is hard to conceivewhat a
person would be if he or she was other than his or her own race. In
contrast, we can imagine that a person might or might not be
exposed to different levels of physical activity, so we can validly
ask questions about the causal effects of, say, training schedules on
risk of developing lower limb overuse injuries in distance runners.
Rubin has a slightly more nuanced interpretation; in his view, it is
only possible to deﬁne the causal effects of a variable when it is
clear what it means for a particular individual to be both exposed
and not exposed to that variable.15 He would contend that
epidemiologists should not seek to determine the causal effect of
exposures that do not satisfy this criterion. The same constraint
does not apply to studies of prognosis. Variables that cannot be
manipulated, such as race and gender, are potentially strong
predictors in many contexts.
Confounding
Many associations are not causal. One of the reasons that
associations between exposures and outcomes occur, even when
the exposure and outcome are not causally related, is confounding.
(Another reason is the closely related concept of selection.6)
Confounding occurs when an exposure and its outcome share a
common cause.6 Consider, for example, the weak association
between cognitive impairment and the subsequent risk of falling.
That association may be causal: cognitive impairment could cause
falls. But it is also possible that the association between cognitive
impairment and risk of falling is a non-causal association caused by
confounding. Confounding might arise if, for example, severe
Parkinson’s disease causes both cognitive impairment and falls.
In that case, disease severity would be a confounder of the
relationship between cognitive impairment and falls. In the
presence of confounding, the strength of the association between
an exposure and an outcome does not provide a measure of the
strength of the causal effect of the exposure on the outcome.In studies of aetiology, the objective is to determine the causal
effect, so it is essential to control for confounding. This can be
achieved at the design stage by sampling study participants from
within each stratum of the confounder, and at the analysis stage by
estimating associations within strata or using statistical modelling
to ‘adjust for’ confounders.16 These control strategies are usually
imperfect, because the confounder may be measured imperfectly
(random measurement error produces what is known as ‘regres-
sion dilution bias’17 in statistical adjustments) and because
statistical models used to adjust for confounding may be speciﬁed
incorrectly (eg, non-linear relationships may be treated as linear
relationships). To the extent that there are important confounders,
failure to properly control for confounding will produce biased
estimates of causal effect in aetiologic cohort studies. A researcher
who seeks to study aetiologymust therefore identify all potentially
important confounders, measure themwithout error, and properly
control or adjust for the confounders. To the extent that the
researcher is unable to do that, he or she will obtain potentially
biased estimates of causal effects.
In prognostic cohort studies, there is no need to control for
confounders. To the extent that confounders are strongly associated
with outcomes, it may be useful to obtain data on exposure to
confounders and incorporate confounders as predictor variables in a
prognosticmodel. However, in prognostic studies it is not obligatory
to disentangle causes and confounders; this is because, if the
objective is simply tomake an accurate prognosis, it does notmatter
if the prognosis is based on causal variables or confounders. Even if
the association between exposure and outcome is due purely to
confounding, exposure to confounders can act as a marker of
outcome. At least in theory,when the intention is to studyprognosis,
known confounders can be intentionally omitted from a statistical
model without compromising the validity of the predictions. In
practice, it may be wise to include known strong confounders in
prognostic models, because doing so is likely to increase the
generalisability of the model to other populations.
Analysis
The broad approach to analysing aetiologic studies and
prognostic studies is necessarily quite different. One of the most
important differences is that the analysis of aetiology should be
driven by theory, whereas the analysis of prognosis can, to a greater
extent, be driven by the data. Here, ‘theory’ is used tomean existing
knowledge about causes of, and associations with, the outcome.
Theory can drive the analysis of aetiologic studies in several
ways. For example, theory will suggest plausible confounders,
which need to be controlled for in the analysis. It might also
suggest whether the relationships between particular exposures
and outcomes are likely to be non-linear. In addition, theory can
indicate where there is the possibility of strong interactions
between exposures that need to bemodelled. Finally, theorymight
indicate whether the exposures could lie on the same causal
pathway. (Two exposures lie on the same causal pathway when
one exposure causes a second exposure, which itself causes the
outcome of interest. In that case, the second exposure is called a
mediator.) If the aim is to identify causal effects, great caremust be
taken in the construction of statistical models that incorporate
mediators. For this reason, and because it is essential to identify
and control for all potentially important confounders, aetiologic
studies often use complex statistical models. These models may
include many variables, continuous variables may have non-linear
relationships with outcomes, there may be interactions between
variables, and the model may allow for mediators lying on the
same causal pathway.
In prognostic studies, any statistical model that accurately
predicts outcomes can do the job. It matters relatively little if the
statistical model is speciﬁed incorrectly. That is, it is of little
consequence if particular causal variables are omitted from
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linear relationship, or if an interaction or a mediator effect is
ignored, and so on. (The caveat is that an incorrectly speciﬁed
statistical model is not likely to predict outcomes as strongly as a
correctly speciﬁed model, and may not performwell when applied
to a population that differs from the study sample.)
There are compelling reasons to ignore complexity when
developing prognostic models. Complex prognostic models are
difﬁcult to use in clinical practice. They can only be used to predict
outcomes of individuals if many measurements have been
obtained from those individuals. Also, quite a bit of calculation
is required to generate predictions from complex models – usually
enough to necessitate the use of a computer, but busy clinicians
don’t always have the time or inclination to use a computer to
generate prognoses. The most useful predictive models require
data on only a few easily measured variables and are
simple enough to be applied to individual patients without a
computer. The study by Moseley and colleagues2 is useful because
it identiﬁed a very simple prediction rule: people who experience
high levels of pain (scores of 5 or more on a 10-point scale) in the
week after wrist fracture are at high risk of developing CRPS.
As it is not necessary to properly model the effects of
confounders in prognostic studies, prognostic models can be
constructed largely without regard to theory. Consequently, the
process of developing a predictive model tends to be more data
driven than theory driven – the researcher can rely heavily on
statistical algorithms to ﬁnd the best weighting of an optimally
selected set of predictors that strongly predicts outcomes. The
reliance on data-driven statistical procedures has some important
consequences. Most importantly, data-driven processes for build-
ing statistical models risk ‘over-ﬁtting’. That is, data-driven model
building may generate models that generate very accurate
predictions in the study sample, but perform relatively poorly
when applied to other people from the same population.18 The
simplistic application of stepwise variable selection procedures is
known to be particularly problematic.12 The problem is greatest
when many variables are considered as possible predictors and
(if the outcome is binary) when relatively few people experience
the outcome of interest (ie, when there are few ‘cases’), therefore,
interpretation is most straightforward when the number of
candidate predictors is small and the number of cases is large. A
widely used guideline is that there should be no more than one
candidate predictor for every 10 cases19 (also see Vittinghoff and
McCulloch 20). A range of statistical approaches, including bootstrap
variable regression and penalised regression, have been developed
in an attempt to deal with the problem of over-ﬁtting.18,21–24
That is not to say that over-ﬁtting cannot also be a problem in
studies of aetiology. An undisciplined approach to the analysis of
aetiologic studies can also produce over-ﬁtting. Ultimately, any
statistical model that uses data-driven algorithms – even careful,
theory-driven analyses of causation (using, for example, the
approach described by Hosmer and Lemeshow25) – must be
replicated in other studies before the ﬁndings can be considered
credible.
Statistics of interest
There is one more important and under-recognised difference
in the way that cohort studies of prognosis and aetiology should
be analysed. In studies of aetiology, the aim is to quantify the
causal effect – the extent to which an aetiologic factor modiﬁes
health outcomes. So studies of aetiology must contrast the
outcomes of people who are and are not exposed to the
aetiologic factor. When the outcome is measured on a
continuous scale, the most common way to quantify the causal
effect is in terms of the mean difference in outcomes of exposed
and unexposed people. When the outcome is binary, the causal
effect is commonly quantiﬁed with a ratio statistic, like therelative risk or odds ratio. The uncertainty in (or imprecision of)
estimates of the average causal effects are usually quantiﬁed
with conﬁdence intervals.
In prognostic studies, there is no interest in causal effects, so
there is no need to contrast outcomes of exposed and unexposed
people. Instead, the primary purpose is to estimate the expectation
of the outcome. For continuous outcomes, the expectation is the
mean outcome, and for binary outcomes, the expectation is the
proportion of people experiencing that outcome. Prognostic
studies may also generate predictions in speciﬁc subpopulations,
either by stratifying risk estimates or by using statistical models to
generate estimates for any combination of predictive factors.16
Even then, the ultimate aim should still be to estimate the expected
outcome within each stratum, not to contrast the risk in different
strata.
It is necessary to quantify the performance of prognostic
models. And in prognostic models, performance is determined not
by the precision of estimates of effect (as in studies of causation)
but by the ability to correctly discriminate individual people’s
outcomes.18 When outcomes are measured on a binary scale,
discrimination is frequently summarised with the ‘area under the
curve’ statistic. When outcomes are measured on continuous
scales, discrimination can be quantiﬁed with a correlation
coefﬁcient (such as r) or a coefﬁcient of determination (r2). The
amount of uncertainty in an individual’s prognosis can be
quantiﬁed with prediction intervals.
One statistic that is used infrequently in studies of prognosis
with binary outcomes, but which would appear to be particularly
useful, is the predictive likelihood ratio (see theMoseley study2 for
one example of a study that reported predictive likelihood ratios).
Likelihood ratios can be used to predict the outcomes for an
individual based both on prior knowledge about the individual’s
prognosis and the particular values of the predictor variables for
that individual. They are widely used in the interpretation of
diagnostic tests26 and arguably should be used much more in
studies of prognosis. Likelihood ratios can be estimated directly
with conventional logistic regression models.27
Interpretation
The primary motivation for studying the aetiology of a health
condition is to suggest mechanisms through which health
interventions might act and, in that way, to inform development
of new interventions. To the extent that an exposure causes a
health condition, interventions that reduce that exposure can
prevent the health condition from developing. And to the extent
that a health intervention has its effects solely by reducing an
exposure, the maximal possible effect of the health intervention is
equal to the causal effect of the exposure.
Prognostic studies do not provide estimates of causal effects, so
they should not be used to guide decisions about selection of
health interventions. Instead, the value of prognostic studies is that
they can generate prognostic information that can be used to
advise patients about the probability of developing particular
health outcomes. In addition, data from prognostic studies can be
used to identify people with a poor prognosis. Identiﬁcation of
people with a poor prognosis is potentially useful because many
health interventions, particularly preventive interventions, are of
most beneﬁt for people with the worst prognoses.28
Summary
This Research Note has described differences between cohort
studies designed to investigate aetiology and prognosis. While it
will often be the case that questions about both aetiology and
prognosis are best answered with cohort studies, the design and
analysis of such studiesmust be quite different. The differences are
summarised in Table 1.
Table 1
Differences in the design and analysis of cohort studies of aetiology and prognosis.
Aetiology Prognosis
Objective is to determine the causes of particular health outcomes.
Primary interest is in effects.
Objective is to predict health outcomes. Primary interest is in outcomes.
Only exposures that can be manipulated are of interest because
only they can have deﬁnable causal effects.
Any exposure can be a predictor.
Analysis should be theory driven. Analysis can be data driven, so care must be taken with ‘over-ﬁtting’.
Models must include all non-ignorable determinants of
outcome, including all confounders.
Confounding is irrelevant. Elaborate models are often unhelpful. Simple models with
few predictors are preferred because they are more useful in clinical practice.
Exposures (putative causes) must be measured with
little or no error.
Exposures (predictors) should be easily measured.
Model must be correctly speciﬁed or estimates of causal effects
may be biased. May have to model non-linear effects,
interactions and mediator variables.
Predictions can still be accurate, even if the model is incorrectly speciﬁed.
Analysis involves contrasting outcomes with and without exposure. Analysis involves estimating expected outcomes.
Can be used to develop new health interventions. Can be used to inform people of their prognoses and to identify those at
high risk for whom intervention is most likely to be effective.
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